in the boundaries of rückwärtiges Heeresgebiet Süd (later redesignated Heeresgebiet Β), a mixed group of German, Hungarian and indigenous troops struggled to maintain the Reich's grip over large portions of central and eastern Ukraine in the face of mounting popular discontent and growing pressure from the Soviet partisan movement. In the northern portion of the Heeresgebiet -the Chernihiv 6 and Sumy regions -poorly equipped and badly trained Hungarian units confronted increasingly formidable partisan groups, while German security forces deployed farther to the south enjoyed relative quiet for much of the year. As Hungarian casualties mounted, this imbalance provoked a dispute between senior German and Hungarian officers: the Hungarians complained bitterly about the disparity between their responsibilities and their resources, while the Germans insisted that they must make do. Because there was nothing that either party could do to redress fundamental issues such as manpower shortages and (to a lesser extent) inadequate equipment, the controversy came to a head over the question of reprisals against Ukrainian villages. Unable or unwilling to strike the partisans directly, Hungarian units burned many villages and shot large numbers of civilians in crude retaliation for Soviet incursions. This prompted complaints from German commanders and from Ukrainian collaborators as well, both of whom argued that such devastation was ineffectual and counterproductive. Eventually, a Hungarian general proposed the extermination of all the male inhabitants between 15 and 60 years of age within a partisan-dominated area of his jurisdiction. The Heeresgebiet leadership responded by urging restraint, and argued that such extreme repressive measures would only aggravate the guerrilla problem. Ultimately, the Germans and their Hungarian allies reached a compromise solution in which a number of villages were evacuated and destroyed in September and October of 1942.
Given our current understanding of the brutal and indiscriminate character of German anti-partisan operations, which some historians have characterized as deliberately genocidal, the respective roles played by German and Hungarian commanders in this situation seem surprising. In reality, however, there is less reason to be surprised than one might suppose. First, the consensus literature on the partisan war on the eastern front, which rightly focusses on events in Belarus (i.e. in Reichskommissariat Ostland and the rear area of Army Group Center), has tended to overlook an important pro-Ukrainian tendency in the German army's occupation policies. While much of occupied Ukraine fell under the rapacious rule of Erich Koch's Reichskommissariat Ukraine, a large area east of the Dnipro remained under military administration for much of 1942 and 1943 . Although the inhabitants of this area remained subject to many of the Reich's most exploitative policies, including devastating plunder of the economy, a number of senior German officers had adopted the pro-Ukrainian bias preached by the Rosenberg ministry from the earliest stages of BARBAROSSA. Their ranks included Lt. General Karl von Roques, the commander of Heeresgebiet Süd, and his deputy and successor, Lt. In this article, Ukrainian place names are given in the Ukrainian form wherever possible, using the Library of Congress system of transliteration (thus »Chernihiv« in preference to the more familiar »Chernigov«). The Russian equivalents used in German documents are provided only where those documents are quoted directly, or where Russified place names are given in the document headings. Actual Russian place names are given in the appropriate Russian form (e.g. »Gomel«). My thanks to Roman Senkus of the Journal of Ukrainian Studies for his help with these transliterations. eral Erich Friderici. Though neither of these men appears to have questioned the necessity of the war against »Jewish Bolshevism« (both of them actively facilitated the SD's efforts to exterminate the Jews of the Ukraine 7 ) they consistently sought to protect the ethnic Ukrainian majority from the most severe features of the German occupation system, including (in some instances) reprisals for partisan activity 8 . Their motives were without question pragmatic rather than humanitarian, 7 The extermination of the Jews of the USSR in areas of military administration has yet to be thoroughly researched. A forthcoming study of Ukraine by Dieter Pohl will do much to redress this problem: Dieter Pohl, »Schauplatz Ukraine: Der Massenmord an den Juden im Militärverwaltungsgebiet und im Reichskommissariat 1941 -1943«, in: LagerVernichtung -Öffentlichkeit, ed. by Norbert Frei, (Munich 2000 . Both von Roques and Friderici repeatedly echoed Hitler's rhetoric about the war against »Jewish Bolshevism« in the east. Generally, the evidence of active cooperation with the SD is stronger for von Roques than for Friderici. Von Roques specifically directed that Jews should be singled out as reprisal victims in an order dated 16 August 1941. At least one such reprisal execution is know to have occurred while he commanded the Heeresgebiet. He further directed that the commanders of POW transit camps (Durchgangslager or Dulags) within his jurisdiction should assist SD units in the racial segregation of prisoners, a step which implied the execution of Jewish soldiers. GFP units under his command cooperated very closely with their SD counterparts, and on at least one occasion delivered captive Jews into the hands of the SD. Units under von Roques' direct command routinely oversaw the identification and registration of Jewish civilians and enforced the wearing of the star of David. In the light of this pattern of cooperation, Roques' well known order of 29 July 1941 which prohibited his soldiers from participating in pogroms should probably be interpreted as an expression of his concern over poor discipline. The same can be said of his subsequent order of 1 September which prohibited unauthorized (eigenmächtig) shootings of civilians, including Jews. Friderici's tenure as Heeresgebiet commander witnessed numerous shooting of Jews by Heeresgebiet troops during anti-partisan operations. In none of these cases did he question the grounds for the shootings or reprimand the responsible commanders. For the entire period of Heeresgebiet Süd/B's existence, there are only two written criticisms of the SS to be found in the document record. Following the Stalingrad debacle, the Heeresgebiet operations staff complained that the HSSPF for southern Russia would not surrender his allotted share of horses. but this tendency in their policies was in fact well established before the belated German attempt to pursue a wider collaborative occupation strategy in 1942 and 1943 9 . At the same time it is also clear that Hungarian units did in fact use severely brutal methods in the effort to crush partisan resistance in rear areas. Gosztony's blanket assertion that Honvédség troops were less inclined to kill civilians than were the Germans does not hold up under careful scrutiny of German sources (not to mention Soviet or Hungarian) 10 . Indeed, it seems that several of the most extreme reprisals which took place within Heeresgebiet Süd were perpetrated by Hungarian units.
Both of these points suggest that the German-Hungarian wrangle over reprisals was not such a startling reversal of roles after all. But there is also an important qualification to be added where the German officers are concerned: their insistence on »proper« or »reasonable« treatment of the civil population must not be taken at face value. Though the Heeresgebiet commanders continued to espouse a proUkrainian point of view until the collapse of the German military administration in Ukraine in late 1943, the actual effects of their paternalism were never great, and they became increasingly slight as the war in Soviet Russia dragged on. Many factors beyond the control of Heeresgebiet leaders frustrated their efforts to cultivate the cooperation of the inhabitants. The forced-labor round-ups of the Sauckel organization, which went forward in Ukraine over von Roques' and Friderici's strong protests, are perhaps the best example. But their own anti-partisan methods were never as different from those of the Hungarians as they seem to have believed, and the severity of German measures did much to alienate majority opinion in Ukraine 11 . The Heeresgebiet commanders' guidance on anti-partisan operations was often contradictory, reflecting a powerful tension between their desire to fight what they considered a »clean« war and their determination to crush an ideological enemy which they genuinely despised. Careful examination of the more restrained anti-partisan operations conducted by the Heeresgebiet in 1942 shows that the ethnic Ukrainian civil population in the affected areas suffered greatly despite the staff's policy of favoritism. The same is true of the evacuations carried out in September and October, during which only the most rudimentary arrangements were made to care for the evacuees. Whatever claims the Heeresgebiet leadership could make about its own »proper« treatment of the populace were based at least in part on a division of labor which left much of the dirty work to other agencies It is interesting to speculate about why the Heeresgebiet commanders (and many of their senior subordinates) attempted to draw such a distinction between Hungarian practices and their own. It is possible that their persistent criticism of their allies reflected the conflict between their self-image as decent, professional soldiers and the many horrors for which their army had become responsible since 22 June 1941. A detailed exploration of the mentality of the Heeresgebiet leadership, however, lies outside the scope of this article. The main point of this discussion is to demonstrate the active participation of Hungarian forces in the Vernichtungskrieg on the eastern front, and to raise questions about the roots of this participation which may stimulate further research.
The research for this article was conducted with German, Soviet and (to a very limited extent) Hungarian archival materials. The German sources include the records of Heeresgebiet Süd (later redesignated »B«) and its subordinate security divisions and regional and local garrisons (Kommandanturen). These documents, held by the German Federal military archive in Freiburg (Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv or BA-MA), are substantially intact for the year 1942, and contain a wealth of material generated by relatively low-level commands (German and Hungarian) in. close contact with the civil populace. Some of these records are also cited below from the microfilm collections produced by the U.S. National Archives at Alexandria, Virginia (hereafter »Alexandria Microfilms«). On the Soviet side, various records of the Soviet partisan movement in Ukraine, the communist party underground organization, and the NKVD have been consulted, along with some materials produced by various government commissions which began investigating the history of the German occupation as early as 1944. These are housed in the Central State Archive of Public Organizations in Kiev (Tsentral 'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads 'khykh ob 'iedan ' -TsDAHO), and in the Chernihiv (Derzhavnyi arkhiv Chernihivs'koi oblasti -DAChO) and Sumy (Derzhavnyi arkhiv Sumskoi oblasti -DASO) region (oblast) archives. Additionally, some material has been drawn from interviews the author conducted with elderly residents of the Chernihiv and Sumy districts in the summer of 1997. Where Hungarian sources are concerned, the author has been able to obtain copies of activity reports submitted by Hungarian units operating in Heeresgebiet Süd from the military historical archive (Hadtôrtnélmi Levâtar -HL) in Budapest.
II. The Ukrainian partisan war to March of 1942
In the initial months of BARBAROSSA the Wehrmacht had little trouble from Soviet partisans. Stalin had refused to sanction the formation of a partisan organization before the invasion, and Soviet authorities initially had scant success impro-vising one after the Germans struck 12 . Those groups that did spring up in the German rear under the leadership of local party officials or the NKVD enjoyed little popular support and were easily dealt with by the second-rate units the Ostheer deployed in rear areas. This was perhaps especially (though not exclusively) true in Ukraine. Although special pre-invasion directives had exhorted German commanders to make heavy use of violent reprisals against civilians in the event of irregular resistance to the German advance, it seems that this was seldom found necessary 13 Sovetskogo krestianstva ν tylu vraga, 1941 -1944 , (Moscow 1962 ; V.l. Klokov, Vsenarodnaia borba ν tylu nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov na Ukraine 1941 -1944 , (Kiev 1978 . Leonid Grenkevich's recent book on the Soviet partisan movement contains a comprehensive bibliography of Soviet-era literature, but offers little in the way of new information or interpretation: Leonid Grenkevich, The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941 -1944 (London 1999 These were the infamous »criminal orders« promulgated by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces High Command) and Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command) in the months preceding the invasion. The most important of these was perhaps the Gerichtsbarkeitserlaß (Decree on Military Justice) which suspended the rules of land warfare, hitherto respected by the Wehrmacht, for the duration of the war with Soviet Russia. Among its many provisions was the devolution of authority to order reprisals against enemy civilians to the level of battalion commanders, and the authorization granted to any commissioned officer to order summary executions of resistance suspects. For discussion of the »criminal orders« and their origins, see Förster, »Das Unternehmen >Bar-barossa<«, in: DRZW, vol. 4., pp. 413-447. MGM 58 (1999) Truman O. Anderson prisais against civilians as »special occurrences« (besondere Ereignisse), it is conceivable that some were not 16 . Nevertheless, it is worth noting that despite sporadic partisan activity, only one case appears in the Heeresgebiet documents before October. On 29 August, motorized Police Battalion 82 of Security Division 454 shot 63 Jewish men at a village called Chervone, after ethnic Ukrainian residents accused local Jews of assisting the partisans 17 .
From October onwards the situation began to change. As the Wehrmacht pushed eastward, it entered districts where communist party officials had had more time to prepare an underground infrastructure and partisan resistance stiffened accordingly. Often fighting alongside isolated bands of Red Army soldiers or with retreating elements of Soviet line forces, the partisans began to strike German units directly. In the Dnipro bend region, fighting between Heeresgebiet security divisions and partisans lasted for many weeks. At roughly the same time, Heeresgebiet forces, reinforced by the 62nd Infantry Division (temporarily detached from the 6th Army) effectively eliminated the Poltava region partisan movement in a series of small engagements in the Myrhorod and Shyshaky districts. Here the conflicted character of Heeresgebiet policy first became apparent. Contrary to von Roques' previous order, Heeresgebiet troops carried out reprisals against several Ukrainian villages in this area with the approval of the staff. Captured partisans or »suspects« were routinely executed in the field by German patrols, and the ratio of German to Soviet casualties was disproportionately low. A number of shootings of Jews also occurred in the course of these operations, making clear that the Heeresgebiet command, like so much of the Ostheer, had incorporated the Jewish-Bolshevik Feindbild into its anti-partisan doctrine 18 . Despite the killings of ethnic Ukrainians/however, the command (now led by Friderici, who replaced von Roques on 27 October) reaffirmed its commitment to a pro-Ukrainian occupation policy in December, declaring that the Ukrainians, as an »Aryan« people, were entitled to friendly and proper treatment. As Friderici explained in an order dated 14 December, »The positive attitude of the Ukrainians toward Germany must by all means be preserved. Their liberation from an intolerable yoke must not be followed by the fear of a new servitude 19 .« Hungarian units under Heeresgebiet command became active in anti-partisan operations at this time and quickly displayed a harshness toward the civil populace which was not tempered by any pro-Ukrainian viewpoint. The Heeresgebiet had at its disposal a Hungarian corps known as the Royal Hungarian Occupation Group East (Königliche ungarische Besatzungsgruppe Ost), comprised of the 102nd, 105th and 108th brigades. On 18-19 December, German intelligence identified a partisan group estimated 1,700 strong in the vicinity of Koriukivka, a district Seat located roughly 75 km northeast of Chernihiv. Their report claimed that this band was composed of Soviet officers from the 4th Army, party officials and local »leading communists,« plus »an entire Jew battalion,« and was equipped with mortars, automatic weapons, and a large number of horses 20 . On 20 December the 2nd battalion, 105th (Hungarian) Brigade led by Colonel Kálmán Csiby was dispatched to eliminate the guerrillas. Two days later, the brigade reported that 700-800 partisans had been killed in battle and that the remainder had escaped into neighboring Army Group Center, which had failed to provide a blocking force to prevent their flight. The reports also noted that a band of 90 Jews who had allegedly procured food for the guerrillas had been executed at some point in the operation and at least one village (Reimentarivka in the Koriukivka district) burned to the ground 21 . There are no detailed descriptions of the battles at Kariukivka in German records. Given the generally poor performance of this Hungarian brigade in subsequent operations, it is likely that the body count of 700-800 partisans is highly inflated. It is nevertheless clear that more than one hundred persons were killed. A late Soviet-era account states that 114 people were massacred by Hungarian troops in Reimentarivka. A leaflet produced in December of 1941 by the Chernihiv district partisan movement also mentioned the killings 22 . Hungarian casualty figures reveal that some genuine fighting did indeed take place, but also lend credence to the supposition that most of the dead »partisans« were civilians shot in reprisal: the brigade reported that only seven Hungarians were killed and but ten wounded during the cording to a report made by the Feldkommandant, the partisans also terrorized the inhabitants of Ivanivka by cutting off the hands of Ukrainian policemen's children and dragooning 19 men into their own ranks 27 .
Like their German counterparts, the officers of the Hungarian Besatzungsgruppe looked upon partisans and their supporters not as soldiers but as criminals. The losses suffered in this period -though nothing like those of front-line infantry units -were therefore particularly galling and the frustration of the Hungarian troops mounted. Their commanders requested reinforcements and complained that their German comrades were demanding too much of them. At the same time their attitude toward the civil populace in their zone of operations began to harden, and they escalated their own use jrf force against the partisans. After captured partisans overpowered and killed two Hungarian soldiers assigned to guard them, the 105th Brigade unilaterally announced on 28 January that it would no longer take prisoners 28 .
The German leadership was not deaf to these complaints. In response to pleas from Brigadier General Kolossváry, the commander of the 105th Brigade, and from Lt. Col. Würfel, the commander of Feldkommandantur 194 (based at Chernihiv), the Heeresgebiet command sent some reinforcements to the north and launched a counterattack against the Fedorov group. Troops from Wach-battalion 703 and Landesschützen-battalion 544 joined two Hungarian battalions in the operation, which aimed at surrounding the partisans in their forest bastion south of Yeline. The task force was further augmented by three detachments of German GFP under the command of Leitender Feldpolizeidirektor Stephainski, the senior GFP official in the Heeresgebiet. The intelligence preparations for this attack were unusually good, and despite extremely cold weather (the temperature ranged from -15° to -30°C) and the defection of some Ukrainian policemen prior to the assault, Fedorov's group was driven from its most important base with significant losses. According to his memoir, Fedorov lost 22 men killed and 53 wounded from a detachment numbering roughly 900 strong, including camp followers. The Germans, who overestimated the partisans' casualties, suffered 27 men killed and a further 27 wounded. tie, Hungarian troops under the command of a Lt. Col. Csendes had briefly occupied Yeline. Most of the inhabitants had fled to the surrounding forest, though perhaps as many as 80 people who had remained behind had been killed by a German air strike during the Hungarians' assault. A few days later, however, the Hungarians returned and found that many of the villagers had come back to their homes. According to Csendes' account of the battle, his troops shot 30 people on the spot for resisting arrest, rounded up the remainder and turned them over to the GFP for screening. Csendes then ordered Yeline burned to the ground. Between 29 March and 4 April, a total of 536 persons were arrested in this vicinity. 230 of them were released and 306 sent to a civil internment camp at Gomel pending investigation of their backgrounds. Within Heeresgebiet Siid's records, the story ends there, for Gomel was then situa ted in the rear area of Army Group Center and thus lay outside of Friderici's jurisdiction. However, an NKVD interview with a surviving villager, conducted in 1944, states that the Gomel prisoners were later segregated into two groups on the basis of age. The elderly persons were released on condition that they never return to the Yeline area. The remainder, apparently including women and children, were shot 30 .
We can only speculate as to how the Heeresgebiet staff might have reacted to news of these executions, if indeed they ever received word of the killing. Overall, the German leadership was very pleased with the outcome of the operation, and seemed convinced that the troublesome northern area had been definitively pacified. The commander of Wach-battalion 703 was very satisfied with the accomplishments of his middle-aged soldiers, and von Roques himself, now returned from medical leave, expressed his pride in the men in marginal comments written on an after-action report 31 . If the Germans had any complaints about the conduct of the Hungarian troops, they failed to commit them to paper. Csendes' assessment of the battle's outcome was less sanguine: he pointed out that at least 300 partisans had escaped the encirclement. General Kolossváry, on the other hand, was more positive about the impact of the operation, but he used his report as an opportunity to surface a number of complaints about the conditions his brigade had thus far endured under Heeresgebiet command. His remarks, peppered with sarcastic barbs, afford us unusual insight into the dynamics of the German-Hungarian alliance relationship, and are therefore worthy of careful attention. 
III. Kolossváry's complaint
In his summary report to the Heeresgebiet on the 105th's activities in this period (including the Yeline operation) Kolossváry devoted four typewritten pages to the theme, »The Difficulties of the Light Division« 32 . The general began by pointing out that half the division's ranks were initially filled with reservists, men whose induction was medically approved only with the understanding that they were unfit for duty at the front. »The enthusiasm and outstanding spirit of the officers and men«, he stated, had for a long time compensated for their poor physical condition and lack of proper training, but the weather, supply problems, long marches, and heavy combat losses had caused severe difficulties which »without the superhuman moral superiority of the commanders« would have meant a »serious and dangerous decline in readiness«. He went on to explain the impact of these factors in detail. The division had commonly encountered temperatures of -30°C in January while' marching through waist-high snow drifts. Seven men had been permanently debilitated by frostbite, and 250 had suffered second degree injuries. Individual battalions were scattered in small enclaves at Horodnia, Bákhmach, Nizhyn, Novhorod-Severs'kyi, and Iampil', some of them 70-80 km removed (as the crow flies) from the division headquarters and field hospital at Chernihiv. Many had no access to rail transport and were unreachable by motor vehicles, owing to the impassible condition of the roads. Supply difficulties were therefore severe and mail infrequent. Some elements of the division had marched more than 2,500 km during the winter and were quartered in »Ukrainian houses, unheated or warmed by dung from the outside, used simultaneously as both stalls and home, together with the residents or their animals in a single room.« Sanitation was primitive or non-existent, and even when delousing supplies were available it was impossible to keep the men free of parasites. By Kolossváry's reckoning, 101 soldiers from the 105th had been killed in battle by the end of March and 129 wounded. The wounded suffered greatly during the jarring evacuation to Chernihiv over bad roads and in frigid weather.
All of these travails, Kolossváry noted, had contributed to the troops' feeling that »an alien and only temporary command lacks understanding of their efforts, fails to take the weather situation into account when making demands [upon them], and assigns them impossible tasks.« He hinted gravely that the Soviets (whom he always called »the Russians«) were making good use of this disaffection, sewing »division between German and Hungarian troops by all possible means«. Their favorite device, he claimed, was to blame Hungarian troops for pillaging and burning actually carried out by the partisans. On several occasions, he insisted, the German area commander (Lt. Col. Würfel) had complained to the Heeresgebiet about such incidents without first confirming that Besatzungsgruppe forces were indeed responsible and without bothering to discuss his accusations with Hungarian officers. This, Kolossváry stated flatly, »was not conducive to the deepening of comradely relations«, and made »investigation of the case more difficult«.
Inching toward his conclusion, Kolossváry then described the numerical superiority of the partisans in his area of operations. Noting that this region had pro- duced the best of the partisan groups who fought Napoleon, and also had afforded the White armies one of their last redoubts in the Civil War, he predicted that the conditions were very favorable for the growth of a renewed partisan movement which, if »under German or Hungarian leadership could destroy two light divisions in so large an area.« He underscored his point with one and one-half pages of statistics on the size of his area (44,000 square kilometers, of which 16,000 were wooded), the long distances marched by his troops, and the high number of partisans killed by his command through the end of March (an estimated 5,132). He then finally came to the point, and asked that the division be relieved of all static security jobs by Ukrainian auxiliaries, that the units then detached from the division be returned to its operational control, that his troops receive flame throwers, mortars, additional anti-tank guns and submachine-guns, and that the Heeresgebiet make a better effort to keep the division command informed. All in all, these were very modest requests. Some of von Roques' German subordinates who had less grounds for complaint would ask for much more in the months to come. Although von Roques, like his successor Friderici, would never opênly accept manpower shortages and equipment problems as an excuse for failure, he was not unsympathetic to Kolossváry's situation. Prior to receiving the Hungarian general's letter, he had described the 105th Light Division's predicament to the Generalquartiermeister at OKH in understanding terms 33 .
The issue of reprisals remained in the background in the correspondence between the Hungarians and the Heeresgebiet for a time. In Kolossváry's report, it had only surfaced in connection with the friction between the division and the German area command, and the commanding general had described the population's behavior in mixed but on the whole favorable terms. By the beginning of summer, however, the Hungarians' attitude towards the civil populace in their zone had hardened further, and reprisals became the focal point of the tactical and strategic debate between the allies.
IV. Summer operations and the dispute over reprisals
The springtime floods and withdrawal of the Fedorov group into the territory of Army Group Center brought a temporary respite to the Hungarians. There were no significant clashes with the partisans in April or May. The Heeresgebiet commander was preoccupied with preparations for FALL BLAU, the coming offensive into the Caucasus, and in any case had but 1,320 men available for active anti-partisan operations in the more than 100,000 square kilometers for which he was responsible 34 . In June, however, the Heeresgebiet boundary was expanded eastward into the Sumy region, and this brought the meager forces in the north into direct contact with the stronger partisan groups rooted in the Briansk forest. Some of these were in fact operating from forward bases in the Sumy region itself, and had ranged as far south and west as Iampil'. At the end of June, the Heeresgebiet received some temporary reinforcements from Heeresgebiet Mitte and drew together another ragtag task force to attack Sidor Kovpak's large partisan group near Putyvl'. Elements of the 108th and 105th Hungarian Light Divisions, a »Turkic« battalion recruited from Soviet POWs and a company of airfield guards and construction troops from Konotop (called »Group Becker«) formed the bulk of the available manpower, and were supported by a company of captured tanks, some engineers, and flak artillery, for a total of about 1,200 men 35 .
The operation took place between 20 and 26 June. The results were mixed, and the unsatisfactory outcome brought the conflict between the Hungarian and German leadership to a boil. The Besatzungsgruppe headquarters reported that 250 partisans fell in battle, and that Hungarian units had shot or hanged 143 persons after capture. They also sent an unspecified number of prisoners to Putyvl' for screening by the GFP 36 . All the participants agreed, however, that most of the partisans had escaped. General Imre Bogányi, commander of the Besatzungsgruppe, was convinced that the civil population was responsible for this: they had harbored and supported the partisans and helped them to avoid encirclement. While the fighting was still in progress, he had expressly ordered the destruction of the villages of Nova Sloboda, Iatsyne, Cherepovo, Ivanivskyi and Sesiulyn, along with other villages to be designated by the commander of the 34th (Hungarian) Infantry Regiment. He also demanded the execution of all the male inhabitants of these communities between the ages of 15 and 60, along with all the male prisoners who had been arrested and sent to Putyvl'. All female prisoners tattooed beneath their breast with the Soviet star (allegedly a sign of reliability used by the Soviet underground) were also to be executed. Not yet content, Bogányi also ordered the execution of ten hostages at Beriukh, to be followed by the killing of five more male hostages from each Of the neighboring villages -this in reprisal for a bomb explosion at Beriukh on 25 June 37 .
Direct German documentation for the implementation of these orders exists only for the destruction of Nova Sloboda and two other villages -Kalitshe and Li- 
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Truman O. Anderson novo. In any case, the devastation was sufficient to provoke the criticism of General von Weichs, the commander of neighboring Army Group von Weichs. On 3 July, he complained to Friderici that the Hungarians' destruction of villages had gotten out of hand, and had done nothing to diminish the partisan threat at Iampil' and Seredyna-Buda. Weichs requested the action of German troops, and offered this impression of the Putyvl' operation:
»2.) Putiwl too cleared. Action of Hungarian troops failed = roughly 1,300 bandits broke out = 12 villages and 460 tons of grain among other important foodstuff supplies destroyed by burning by Hungarian troops. Population fled. Relief is urgently requested 38 .« Friderici had been present in the Putyvl' area during the fighting. His role in the Hungarians' reprisals is therefore not altogether clear. He seems at least to have agreed with Bogányi that the partisans had been helped by local villagers, for he repeated this claim in a subsequent report to OKH 39 . On the other hand, either Friderici or some member of his Heeresgebiet operations staff had annotated Bogányi's report indicating disapproval of the proposed mass executions 40 . Immediately after the Putyvl' fighting, the Heeresgebiet commander produced a new series of instructions for anti-partisan operations that were sharply critical of indiscriminate retaliation against non-combatants and severely restricted the use of reprisals.
The new instruction was in many ways reminiscent of the series of orders promulgated by the Heeresgebiet command in 1941 which were intended to clarify who should be considered a combatant (i.e. entitled to POW status if captured) and who should be deemed a »partisan«. It featured the familiar stock arguments about »the cruelty of the Jewish-Bolshevik method of war«, and the resultant need for »hardness«, and its early paragraphs contained nothing which departed from the spirit of previous directives. There then followed some new material on the treatment of deserters, to the effect that partisan deserters were only to be spared summary execution if they surrendered when their unit was not in contact with German forces (Red Army soldiers, on the other hand, were to be treated as POWs regardless of how they surrendered); Under the heading, »Collective Punishment«, however, Friderici introduced a new series of restrictions which brought Heeresgebiet doctrine much closer to the spirit (if not the letter) of the army's old, pre-B ARB AROSSA regulations. »Our remorseless war of annihilation against the Freischärler pestilence applies to the guilty«, he began. To kill truly innocent people, he wrote, »contradicts the German sense of justice and has, for political reasons, disadvantageous consequences«. Friderici stated that the partisans had been instructed by Moscow to goad German units into collective punishment of civilians in order to »sow hate and discord against Germany and its supporters among the population«. This, he continued, must be avoided. Generalized threats of hostage killings and the actual executions conducted in the event of sabotage »make absolutely no impression upon the mentality of the Bolshevik bands«. In the same sense, he said: »Burning down whole villages and exterminating their entire population is not a military tactic employed as part of an anti-partisan operation in progress, rather [is] the sharpest of reprisals [undertaken] after battle, when, through continuing investigation, it is established that the affected locality and its residents participated in its entirety in the partisan activity.« Friderici concluded by stating that reprisals carried out without these preconditions destroyed potential quarters for German troops, disrupted the economic exploitation of the land, squandered precious labor resources, created Soviet martyrs and increased popular support for the partisans 41 .
This was not the first time that the Heeresgebiet command had attempted to curb excessive violence by its troops. Von Roques had prohibited recourse to what he called »lynch justice« in July of 1941 42 . In this instance, however, there can be little doubt that Friderici had the Hungarian leadership in mind. The contrast between his new conception of counter-insurgency and the wildly indiscriminate steps Bogányi was advocating could not be more striking. Friderici had insisted that reprisals should only occur where the populace »in its entirety« (in ihrer Gesamtheit) supported the partisans. This was a standard of civilian guilt which no unit in the field could reasonably be expected to prove, a fact which raises the immediate question of Friderici's intentions. It is unlikely that he meant to prohibit »proper« reprisals. Just a few days after he promulgated these new instructions, the GFP unit stationed at Nizhyn executed 116 persons from Volodko in reprisal for the killing of a single GFP sergeant. This massacre took place on the orders of the German area commander, yet Friderici apparently made no complaint 43 . Instead, he probably intended to discourage the type of reflexive burnings and mass executions of villagers which took place during the Putyvl' operation. If so, his intentions may have been immediately frustrated in the short term. Though Bogányi had reported that Nova Sloboda was destroyed on 26 June, two Soviet reports prepared by the Putyvl' district committee (raikom) in October and November of 1943 maintain that a punitive detachment returned to the village on 6 July. The following day marauding troops allegedly shot or burned to death 407 people in Nova Sloboda 44 .
Complaints about disciplinary problems and the operational shortcomings of the Hungarian troops poured into the Heeresgebiet from other quarters at this time as well, giving added momentum to the debate over reprisals. The German area commander of Feldkommandantur 194, the very man Kolossváry had earlier accused of making unsubstantiated charges against his men, forwarded on 18 July some bitter complaints about Hungarian troops from the mayor of Putyvl'. The mayor accused Besatzungsgruppe soldiers of murder, rampant thievery and indiscriminate burning of villages. The Feldkommandant also included his own barb about the recent Putyvl' operation in his report: »Driving the bands from one area into the other is in the end purposeless, for it is the rural population, over whose villages the bands flood and from whose supplies they nourish themselves wherever they halt, who always suffer, and whose mayors must be in perpetual fear that they will be rounded up and done away with. Only the destruction (of the partisans) will liberate the population from the nightmare which presently lies upon them 45 .« Note that these sensible words come from the very same man who just days earlier had ordered the execution of 116 persons at Nizhyn. In the same period, Ortskommandantur 307 (located within Feldkommandantur 194) complained that Hungarian troops from the 105 th division who were billeted in its area had destroyed their quarters, while the officers of Turkic Infantry Battalion 450 wrote to Friderici claiming that Hungarian troops routinely failed to support them in combat if doing so meant an approach march through woodland 46 . With such recriminations flying, back and forth, further criticism of the Hungarian divisions from the Heeresgebiet was bound to provoke an annoyed response. Three days after issuing the new reprisal instruction, Friderici followed up with new tactical guidelines for the anti-partisan campaign. This document is lost, but four separate commands -Security Division 213, Feldkommandanturen 194 and 198, and the Besatzungsgruppe -wrote memoranda to Friderici in reply. All have survived, and they provide enough information for us to piece together the gist of the original. The thrust of the guidelines seems to have been, »make do with what you have and be more aggressive.« By this point Friderici, who had himself complained to his superiors many times about his inadequate manpower, must have realized that he was simply not going to get more troops. He apparently sought to make this clear to his own subordinates in these new guidelines, and urged them to drive their men harder and to adopt more sophisticated tactics. Bogányi reacted to these suggestions with open indignation. In his reply, he spelled out in detail the problems faced by his troops, adding »It is not enough to demand >hardness< towards the troops [as] this hardness already exists on the part of both the Hungarian leadership and the troops as well and cannot be made a basis for criticism.« Bogányi was a professional officer, however, and he did not limit his reply to this defense of his troops' reputation. Honor satisfied, he then put forward a detailed counter-proposal, much as Kolossváry had done in his report of 31 March. Although reprisals per se are not mentioned in his text, it is otherwise apparent that Bogányi's thoughts were focused not on tactical questions but on how to deter popular support for the partisans. He commented at one point that the GFP were »too kind hearted« in their work, and elsewhere that the inhabitants of partisan-friendly areas must not be allowed any economic activity ( Wirtschaftsinteressen). Where necessary, he added, they should be allowed to starve. While many of his ideas were not new, he proposed a step which ultimately provided the Heeresgebiet with a practical solution to the problem of popular support of the partisans in the north: evacuation. Bogányi advocated complete evacuation of the male inhabitants of the most thoroughly partisan-dominated areas, the evacuees to be sent to work camps where their labor could be more effectively used 47 . It is possible that this reflects his own appreciation, based on the new reprisal order of 2 July, that Friderici would not endorse anything more severe.
Whether Friderici had thought about evacuating the threatened northern border areas himself prior to receiving Bogányi's suggestion is not known. He seized upon the idea, however, requesting permission from Heeresgruppe Β on 10 September to evacuate and devastate the region between Seredyna-Buda and the Desna east of Hremiach. Velyka Berizka, Holubivka, Lisne, Bilousivka, Stiahailivka, Znob-Novhorods'ke, Liubakhiv, Ukrainskyi, Chervony, and Vasilivka were to be evacuated and dismantled for fuel and building material. Though there is little documentation available in the surviving German records, it seems that these evac- Relocation of the population of guerrilla dominated areas has been a feature of numerous counterinsurgency campaigns, including the American Civil War (western Missouri), the Philippine Insurrection, the Boer War, the Japanese pacification of Manchuria, Malaya (1948 -1960 , Kenya (1952 Kenya ( -1956 , and Vietnam. As this series of examples suggests, it has sometimes proved an effective technique, and sometimes it has not. The effectiveness of these new measures in Heeresgebiet Süd is difficult to assess. The Heeresgebiet intelligence officer (Ic) believed that the partisans' logistical situation had become grave after the deportations, and claimed that this was the cause of an increase in partisan activity noted in October. The deteriorating situation at the front brought such chaos in the months to come, however, that it is impossible for us to tell whether the desired strategic effects would have been achieved in the long run.
The effect that the evacuations had on the civil population is not well documented. It is nevertheless not hard to imagine. Heeresgebiet records indicate only that the evacuees were dispersed in communities farther to the south and west instead of being sent to internment camps. This was certainly better than being shot, and may have been a more humane arrangement than the forced labor inflicted on other evacuees who passed through the Gomel camp, but the scarcity of food alone would have entailed significant hardships for the women, children and elderly persons who still clung to life in this war torn area at the time of the evacuations. It is also important to recognize that killings of persons accused of pro-Soviet activity continued in other forms. At Friderici's request, the SD had intensified its activities in the northern part of the Heeresgebiet beginning in July. By mid-August, an Einsatzkommando operating in the Sumy district had executed 1,508 persons suspected of pro-Soviet activity 49 .
As a solution to the thorny problem of inter-allied relations within Heeresgebiet Β, the evacuation program was at best a qualified success. Bogányi sought additional evacuations in November and was rebuffed, and German complaints about the Hungarians' combat performance did not cease. After the end of October, however, there were no more reprisals recorded within the Hungarians' area or indeed within the Heeresgebiet as a whole for the remainder of the year, a fact which suggests that the evacuations did placate Bogányi and his subordinates to some extent. In concert with Friderici's new instructions on reprisals, the evacuation policy does therefore seem to have reduced the frequency with which Heeresgebiet forces made recourse to collective punishment.
V. Conclusions
The information brought to light in this article potentially bears upon a number of debates and sub-debates within east front historiography. Limitations of time and space require, however, focussing on one basic point.
Regardless of how one interprets the contradictory orders and actions of the Heeresgebiet command during 1942, it is clear that the Hungarian units operating within the jurisdiction displayed the same propensity toward brutality in the-partisan war as did the German army in general. The early operation at Koriukivka in December of 1941 displayed all of the characteristics we typically associate with German excesses, including wildly disproportionate casualty figures, the destruction of a »partisan« village, and the highly suspicious execution of a group of Jewish »partisan helpers«. Much the same may be said of the behavior of Hungarian troops in the fighting at Yeline in March and in the larger operation near Putyvl 1 in late June. General Bogányi's draconian plans for widespread destruction of villages and wholesale execution of the male population in this area is perhaps the most chilling evidence that the Besatzungsgruppe chain of command had its own Vernichtungskrieg mentality. This is not to say that all Hungarian units or their commanders behaved in a similar fashion: there are certainly documented episodes where Hungarian units failed to conform with the Nazi conception of the eastern war 50 . But the actions of the Besatzungsgruppe nevertheless raise a number of important questions. Many east front historians have identified National Socialist racial indoctrination as a key source of German brutality towards Polish and Soviet civilians. Evidence of ideological affinity for Nazism on the part of many senior officers has been available for years, and few scholars now deny that Hitler had a fairly firm hold on the mentality of the German Generalität. Ideological constructs justified the Germans' deliberate »starvation strategy« toward the civil populace, the horrific maltreatment of Soviet POWs, the extermination of Soviet Jews and the suspension of the rules of land warfare on the eastern front (including those pertaining to collective punishment). In this sense, ideology indisputably contributed to the »barbarization« of warfare very directly. Its influence on the mind set of ordinary soldiers is less easily established on the basis of traditional forms of historical evidence, but many historians, most notably Omer Bartov, nevertheless assign a pivotal role to the political indoctrination of the rank-and-file 51 . Against this background, what are we to make of identical behavior on the part of Hungarian officers and men who were 
